Among the flurry of pre-trial activity recently in the Magnetar Technologies case, which involves patents directed toward magnetic braking systems used in amusement park rides, was a report and recommendation by Magistrate Judge Thynge in which she granted a motion to exclude the plaintiffs’ infringement expert, Mark Hanlon. Magnetar Techs. Corp., et al. v. Six Flags Theme Parks, Inc., et al., C.A. No. 07-127-LPS-MPT, Report and Recommendation at 1 (D. Del. Feb. 7, 2014).
The defendants first contended in their motion that Mr. Hanlon lacked any specialized knowledge to support his expert opinions because he had not identified any experience with the technology of the patents-in-suit and had admitted multiple times during his deposition that he was not an expert. According to the defendants, Mr. Hanlon’s knowledge was “only general in nature” and that plaintiffs could not explain how Mr. Hanlon’s various work experiences qualified him as an expert in the technology of the patents-in-suit. The plaintiffs responded that the specific knowledge defendants would require – the design of magnetic arrays and the theory of magnetic brakes – was not necessary because Mr. Hanlon had experience as an expert in the “design and structure of amusement park rides” and “the mounting of magnetic brakes.” Id. at 2-4. Judge Thynge found that Mr. Hanlon had “the necessary skill and knowledge as evidenced from his previously described past work experience, his curriculum vitae, his educational background, and his previous involvement in eight magnet eddy braking projects,” which gave him “the qualifications to testify about magnetic brakes, and is capable of identifying the components of a magnetic brake assembly.” Id. at 10-11. Mr. Hanlon was not qualified, however, to testify as to the “theory of operation or the design of magnetic brakes.” Id. at 11.
Second, the defendants requested the Mr. Hanlon’s infringement opinion be excluded because it was “completely unsupported and ungrounded in fact” because it failed to “identify how any accused ride meets the limitations of any asserted claim.” The plaintiffs responded that Mr. Hanlon’s analysis was adequately based on data, principles, specific identified documents, and his own personal knowledge and experience. Id. at 4-5. Here, Judge Thynge found broadly that Mr. Hanlon’s opinion “lack[ed] the proper grounds for his conclusions, because it [was] void of the necessary analysis for comparing each element of the claim to the accused product.” Id. at 11. Judge Thynge explained that Mr. Hanlon’s opinions generally simply “state[ed] the claim limitations followed by general references to several documents and [a] deposition . . . . Nowhere does Hanlon explain why the documents or deposition are relevant to the technology involved or to [the asserted claims], how they show why [the asserted claims] cover[] the accused product, or how they demonstrate or provide the required analysis of the claim elements to the accused product.” Id. at 16. Judge Thynge concluded: “Ipse dixit is defined as ‘something asserted but not proved,’ which exemplifies Hanlon’s expert report. Hanlon only provides data and a conclusion, with the chasm between not bridged by any analysis. Without an explanation for his reliance on and the relevance of the cited documents, the court cannot find any good grounds for his conclusions. Therefore, Hanlon’s expert report is stricken.” Id. at 22.
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