In AVM Technologies, LLC v. Intel Corporation, C.A. No. 15-33-RGA (D. Del. Apr. 28, 2017), Judge Richard G. Andrews denied Plaintiff’s Daubert motion and motion for summary judgment that both implicated a particular piece of alleged prior art, the Pentium Pro (“P6”). As to the Daubert motion, Plaintiff argued that Defendant’s expert’s anticipation opinion relating to the P6 was unreliable “because he relied on ‘uncorroborated statements’ made by ‘an Intel engineer and former engineer/paid consultant.’” Id. at 2. But the Court observed that the expert had, “in fact, rel[ied] on more than just this engineer’s testimony [i.e., “schematics, design manuals, and timing diagrams”],” thus Plaintiff’s objections were more pertinent to whether the expert’s conclusions were correct, rather than unreliable. Id. The Court then rejected Plaintiff’s various arguments that the expert’s anticipation and obviousness opinions were conclusory, as Plaintiff had not responded to Defendant’s rebuttal points or the Court disagreed with Plaintiff’s characterizations of the expert reports, see id. at 3-4.
Plaintiff also moved for summary judgment regarding the alleged lack of evidence of anticipation by the P6. The Court first rejected Plaintiff’s argument that summary judgment could be reached because the anticipation theory was not timely disclosed, where Plaintiff did not indicate when it was first put on notice and where, by contrast, Defendant cited to its invalidity contentions as evidence that Plaintiff had been on notice since 2015. The Court then denied the motion on its merits as well. Some of Plaintiff’s arguments depended on an interpretation of claim language that, while not previously construed by the Court, the Court analyzed in light of its prior constructions and disagreed with Plaintiff’s interpretation. Id. at 5-6. The motion was denied as to other arguments due to the existence of material facts in dispute and issues more suited for Plaintiff’s cross-examination at trial. Id. at 6.