Judge Robinson transferred a false marking case where one of the plaintiffs and the defendant are engaged in patent infringement over four of the same patents at issue in the false marking case (even though it was not the first-filed action), the defendant is not a Delaware corporation and maintains only a small market for its goods in Delaware. Brinkmeier v. Exergen Corporation, C.A. No. 10-176-SLR, Memo. Order (D. Del. Jan. 3, 2011).
Last week, Judge Robinson denied a Rule 56(d) motion by Acceleron in Acceleron, LLC. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., C.A. No. 10-128-SLR (D. Del. Dec. 16, 2010). Faced with a motion for summary judgment of non-infringement, Acceleron sought additional discovery under Rule 56(d) to support its contributory infringement and inducement claims. Acceleron had previously sought the same information, but had agreed to narrow the requests after HP protested and the Court determined that the requests were too broad. Since then, fact discovery has closed, and HP brought a summary judgment motion based on the lack of evidence for contributory infringement and inducement.
The Court denied Acceleron's Rule 56(d) motion, stating that "the court previously determined that these discovery requests were too broad," that "Acceleron [had] represented to the court that every outstanding discovery issue relevent to the instant motions was resolved," and that "Acceleron has had ample opportunities to seek the discovery it requests, and it is inappropriate at this stage of the proceedings to reopen fact discovery." Id. at 6-7.
Yesterday, district judge Sue L. Robinson issued a decision construing two terms and phrases of a patent related to the production of steel. Specifically, the Court construed the following:
"Hot-rolled steel sheet"
"The steel has a very high mechanical resistance"
Of note in the opinion is the procedural posture. At the outset, the Court recounted how the parties "agreed to forego summary judgment practice." Instead, the parties sought and obtained approval of an expedited trial schedule.
In analyzing the summary judgment motions of the parties in Kenexa Brassring Inc. v. Taleo Corp., Judge Robinson needed to address whether the groups of accused products “function in the same manner for purposes of infringement.” C.A. No. 07-521-SLR, Memo. Op., at 9 (D. Del. Nov. 18, 2010). The defendants responded to a contention interrogatory asking why “each” product did not infringe by referring to the products “collectively” and did not explain how any product functioned differently from the other. Id. at 6. The 30(b)(6) designees also testified that they could not think of any distinguishing features between the products. Id. at 6-7. The Court found that defendants “cannot group their products together when asked whether they differ, then turn around and claim that plaintiff has failed to meet its burden of showing that they operate in the same way.” Id. at 10-11.
In QVC, Inc. v. Your Vitamins, Inc., C.A. No. 10-094-SLR (D. Del. Nov. 29, 2010), Judge Robinson granted a motion to transfer in a false advertising case after it was revealed that the parties were bound by an agreement with a forum selection clause and a choice of law provision. Judge Robinson recognized that "Forum selection clauses are presumptively valid and are entitled to great weight," id. at 4-5, and that the other related factors on the whole favored transfer. The case was transferred to the Eastern District of PA.
The presence of an "unambiguous" forum selection clause distinguishes this case from other recent rulings on motions to transfer, which have generally turned on the degree of connection to the forum.
District judge Sue L. Robinson recently construed the terms of several patents that concern systems and methods for collecting and maintaining information about job applicants. The Court issued its claim construction on seven terms and phrases:
1. "Target data strings"
2. "Each field [being] capable of [accommodating /accepting] . . . [a] data string"
3. "Source data [st]ream"
4. "Displaying a structured form comprised of multiple fields"
6. "Supplemental inquiry form"
7. "Nonuniformly formatted source data streams"
Last week, Judge Robinson granted a motion to stay pending re-examination in Vehicle IP, LLC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., C.A. No. 10-503-SLR (D. Del. Nov. 22, 2010). Citing the September decision in Belden (which denied a motion to stay pending re-examination just before trial), the Court applied a simple three-factor test to determine that a stay is warranted in light of the status of the litigation and the lack of prejudice to the parties. One footnote cited re-examination statistics showing that the average appeal to the patent board takes 234 days, plus an additional 15 months to appeal that determination to the Federal Circuit.
Of note, the Court stated that "[i]f, after six months, the court is not satisfied that the reexamination is moving at a pace whereby reexamination will provide a resolution as promptly as would be otherwise achieved through this litigation, the court may lift the stay." Vehicle, at 5.
Last week, Judge Robinson issued a short memorandum order in Eidos Communications v. Skype Tech. SA, C.A. No. 09-234-SLR (D. Del. Nov. 9, 2010), denying a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The motion sought dismissal based on an attached affidavit, which stated that certain steps of an asserted method claim take place only on servers in "Luxembourg, Ireland and the Netherlands." Id. at 6. Thus, the method is not practiced "within the United States" as required by 35 U.S.C. § 271.
Judge Robinson, however, declined to consider the affidavit, holding that it did not "fall within the narrow category of documents considered on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)." Id. at 6 (citing Ricoh Co. v. Oki Data Corp., Civ. No. 09-694-SLR, 2010 WL 3908603 (D. Del. Sept. 30, 2010)). That narrow category includes, among other things, documents attached to the complaint that form the basis of the plaintiff's claims. Eidos, C.A. No. 09-234-SLR, at 3. Without the benefit of the affidavit, the 12(b)(6) motion was denied.
Judge Robinson also refused to convert the motion into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, because "there has been no opportunity for reasonable discovery by either party." Id. at 7.
A recent decision by district judge Sue L. Robinson further develops her policy of prohibiting patent-law experts from testifying. As part of a wide-ranging summary judgment opinion - which covers infringement, validity, and enforceability on a number of patents - the Court emphasized that the case presented "no grounds for exception" to this practice:
"The court denies MEMC's motion to admit the expert testimony of [Gooklasian] regarding: (1) 'the context of when and under what circumstances an applicant may make amendments after receiving an [sic] notice of allowance;' (2) 'procedurally how these amendments are evaluated by the [PTO];' and (3) 'how the applicants here avoided substantive examination of the broad claim scope covering all 'ions' by misuing these two types of post-allowance/post-issuance amendment procedures.' "
The Court continued that it "does not allow patent law experts to testify; this case presents no grounds for exception to the court's practice in this regard. As described by MEMC, Gooklasian offers only general guidance about PTO practice. He has no specific knowledge regarding the '516 or '601 applications or either the PTO's or [examiner's] treatment of the same." (See op. at 26-27 n.16.)
Last week, Judge Robinson issued a lengthy memorandum opinion in Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Man. Corp., C.A. No. 08-542-SLR (D. Del. Nov. 3, 2010), granting in part a motion for judgment as a matter of law and overturning jury verdicts on the issue of invalidity of several patent claims (and denying other motions including a motion for a permanent injunction).
The jury's invalidity findings were reversed for lack of substantial evidence. Judge Robinson had previously granted motions in limine which, "viewed in light of the options available on the jury's verdict sheet, precluded a finding of obviousness based on any single prior art reference or any combination of prior art references that did not include the '564 patent." The Jury found the four claims invalid based on references other than the '564 patent. Judge Robinson held that, because Defendants had been precluded from offering evidence on these references, the jury's verdict could not be supported by substantial evidence.
Judge Robinson also denied Plaintiff's motion for a permanent injunction, under the eBay standard, because of "[Plaintiff]'s failure to define a relevant market, the existence of additional competitors and the non-core nature of [Plaintiff's sale of the relevant products] in relation to its business as a whole."