In St. Jude Medical, et al. v. Volcano Corp., C.A. No. 10-631-RGA (D. Del. June 5, 2012), Judge Andrews recently affirmed and overruled objections to the Magistrate Judge’s decision to exclude certain prior art evidence that was not properly disclosed by plaintiffs until nearly three months after the close of fact discovery. Id. at 2-3. In the opinion, the Court noted that plaintiffs’ invalidity contentions were “useless in terms of giving [d]efendant any information about what theories [plaintiffs] would actually pursue.” Id. at 3. The Court also noted that plaintiffs’ contentions included as invalidating prior art “100 patents, 21 publications, and 92 prior art systems” and that those references that were excluded were “buried amidst” these many other invalidating references. Id. at 3. The Court ultimately held that the Magistrate Judge’s decision to exclude the prior art references was neither “clearly erroneous” nor an “abuse of discretion”; concluding rather, that it was a sanction appropriately “tailored to the nature and extent of the violation.” Id. at 4.
Judge Stark recently issued a final pretrial order with rulings on eight different motions in limine in Tarkus Imaging, Inc. v. Adobe Systems, Inc., C.A. No. 10-63-LPS (D. Del. May 31, 2012). Judge Stark’s in limine rulings included the following:
1. A non-expert witness and that witness’s opinions not previously disclosed under Rule 26 are not per se inadmissible, but specific portions of testimony should be addressed by objection pursuant to the Court’s normal procedures.
2. Defendants may not be barred wholesale from introducing undisclosed expert testimony. Rather, objections to testimony beyond the scope of expert reports should be addressed pursuant to the Court’s normal procedures, and Defendants may elicit fact testimony from fact witnesses regarding how accused products work.
3. Parties are not permitted to argue who “won” or “lost” claim construction, but Defendants may defend willfulness allegations by contending that their proposed constructions were reasonable.
4. Evidence of usage or sale of components that are not the accused functionality is allowed because it is probative of induced infringement and the potential for prejudice does not outweigh the evidence’s probative value.
5. Parties may not present evidence that other parties did not comply with the discovery rules. Allowing the parties to relitigate discovery disputes at trial would be unfairly prejudicial, confusing, and a waste of time.
In Walker Digital LLC, et al. v. Multi-State Lottery Assoc., C.A. No. 10-1113-RGA (D. Del. June 7, 2012), Judge Andrews construed the following terms of U.S. Patent No. 7,740,537 which claims a system and method to allow a lottery player to increase payout received for winning a lottery game:
“is applied to”
“lottery terminal” (no construction necessary)
“lottery server” (no construction necessary)
“determine a price”
“store an indication of a price”
In Tarkus Imaging, Inc. v. Adobe Systems, Inc., et al., C.A. No. 10-63-LPS (D. Del. June 5, 2012), Judge Stark granted Adobe Systems, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment of no willful infringement, explaining that because Adobe asserted “reasonable claim construction positions under which Adobe would not infringe . . . and credible non-infringement theories even under the Court’s different constructions[,]” the plaintiff could not show by clear and convincing evidence that Adobe acted despite an objectively high likelihood that it infringed a valid patent. Id. at 3-4 (discussing first prong of the Federal Circuit’s test for establishing willful infringement under In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). The Court explained that although it “did not ultimately adopt Adobe’s constructions for [the terms ‘output device’ and ‘pictorial dynamic range’] . . . the fact that Adobe asserted reasonable constructions under which its products would not infringe precludes a finding that the first prong of Seagate is satisfied.” Id. at 4. As a result, “the Court should not put the issue of willfulness – including the second “subjective” prong – before a jury.” Id. at 3 (citing Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 663 F.3d 1221, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (satisfying the objective first prong of the willfulness test is “a predicate to the jury’s consideration of the second prong”)). Moreover, the Court explained that Adobe asserted reasonable non-infringement theories even under the Court’s claim construction, also leading to the conclusion that the first prong of the Seagate test could not be satisfied. Id. at 5.
The Court acknowledged that the parties presented genuine disputes of material fact, but explained that those disputed facts related to the subjective second prong of the willfulness test under Seagate, “an inquiry that must not be put before the jury given Tarkus’s failure to satisfy the [objective] first prong.” Id. at 6.
In a recent ANDA case, following full post-trial briefing and in light of the approaching expiration of the 30-month stay, Judge Stark issued a sua sponte order enjoining the defendant from launching its generic product until the Court issues its opinion in the case. Galderma Labs, L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc., C.A. No. 10-45-LPS (D. Del. June 4, 2012).
In Fuisz Pharma LLC v. Theranos, Inc., C.A. No. 11-1061-SLR-CJB (D. Del. May 18, 2012), Magistrate Judge Burke recently issued a Report and Recommendation, recommending that defendant’s motion to dismiss, stay, or transfer be granted in part, and that the case be transferred to the Northern District of California pursuant to the first-filed rule. Id. at 1. On October 26, 2011, Theranos, Inc. (“Theranos”), a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Palo Alto, California, originally brought suit in the Northern District of California (the “California Action”) against Fuisz Technologies, Ltd. and several members of the Fuisz family for inventorship claims under the Patent Act and state law claims alleging that the Fuisz defendants’ misappropriated Theranos’ confidential information and used that information to improperly obtain U.S. Patent No. 7,824,612 (the “’612 patent”). Id. at 2. On October 27, 2011, the same day that they were served with the original Complaint filed in the California Action, two of the individual Fuisz defendants named in the California Action assigned certain rights to the ‘612 patent to Fuisz Pharma LLC (“Fuisz Pharma”), a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of business in Bay Harbor Islands, Florida. Id. at 3. Fuisz Pharma then filed the instant suit on November 1, 2011 in D. Del. (the “Delaware Action”) against Theranos for infringement of the ‘612 patent. Id. at 3. In response to being sued here in Delaware, Theranos filed a motion seeking to have the Delaware action dismissed, transferred to the N.D. Cal., or stayed pending resolution of the California Action, on the grounds that the California Action is the “first-filed” action. Id. at 3. Theranos argued that its motion should be granted pursuant to the first-filed rule “because it filed the California Action prior to Fuisz Pharma’s filing of the instant litigation [in Delaware], and because the California Action involves the same parties and subject matter as this action.” Id. at 7. In its opposition, Fuisz Pharma countered that the first-filed rule did not apply “because the California Action does not involve the same issues and/or the same parties as this infringement litigation [in Delaware].” Id. at 8. More specifically, Fuisz Pharma argued that the two cases are “distinctly different” because the Delaware Action is a “straight forward patent infringement action,” while in the California Action there are “other legal claims at issue.” Id. at 8.
The Court sided with Theranos, concluding that the “first-filed” rule did apply, the California action was, indeed, the “first-filed” action, and that the Jumara factors favored transfer of the Delaware Action to the N.D. Cal. Id. at 8, 35. The Court noted that: (a) “all of the parties in this action are parties to the California Action”; (b) “both cases involve . . . the ‘612 patent”; (c) the claims in both suits “stem, to a very great degree, from the same subject matter and same nucleus of operative facts,” and that (d) “if both actions were allowed to proceed simultaneously, there would be substantial risk of inconsistent judgments.” Id. at 8-14. The Court further noted that the first-filed rule has been applied in patent cases, even where the cases are not so-called “mirror image” cases, provided that the “same common subject matter exists among the two cases.” Id. at 12 (citations and quotations omitted). As part of its analysis of the Third Circuit’s Jumara factors, the Court also noted that the “existence of the first-filed California Action has a significant impact on the balancing of the public and private interests in the case” and that “the balance of those factors weigh strongly in favor of transfer.” Id. at 34.
In Tarkus Imaging, Inc. v. Adobe Systems, Inc., et al., C.A. No. 10-063-LPS (D. Del. May 11, 2012), Judge Stark issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order construing the claim terms of U.S. Patent No. 6,628,823 at issue in the case as follows:
– “original image” means “the image data and other data pertaining to the image prior to performing the claimed processing steps”
– “original” means “two-dimensional object (such as a print, negative, or transparency, artwork, or reproduction defined by an image file)”
– “density capabilities” means “assumed or measurable density values that an assumed or actual output device is capable of producing”
– “density” means “the negative logarithm of reflectance, transmittance, or luminance factor”
– “output device” means “a physical or assumed device used to produce or define a reproduction”
– “pictorial dynamic range” means “the range from the value representing the edge of detail in black to the value representing the edge of detail in white”
– “tone reproduction curve” means “the relationship between the tonal values of an original image and the tonal values of an intended reproduction”
– “tone” means “lightness or brightness of an element in a scene or image”
– “color space values” means “the number or combination of numbers used to represent colors”
– “initial color space values of a scene” means “a number of combination of numbers determined by a capture device to represent colors in a scene (e.g., camera raw or scene referred image data)”
– “capture device” means “a device (e.g., a camera, scanner, or computer) capable of acquiring an image of a scene or original”
– “estimating a key of the original image” means “estimating whether an original image, as a whole, is bring or dark”
– “standard output device” means “a representative real or assumed device having defined associated color space values that are commonly used in image files”
– “applying an S-shaped flex adjustment” means “changing the amount of shaped of a curve”
– “applying a shift adjustment” means “changing the bow (e.g., convexity or concavity of a curve)”
– “scene” means “a real-world view”
– “focal plane image” means “an image formed on a sensor of a capture device”
– “Image file” means “a file containing image data and optionally data pertaining to the image”
In Optimum Power Solutions LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., et al., C.A. Nos. 11-853, 854, 855, 856 (D. Del. May 25, 2012), Judge Stark recently considered motions to transfer four related cases filed by plaintiff Optimum to the Northern District of California. Plaintiff had previously filed a case against three of four of the instant defendants, among others, in the Eastern District of Texas. That court concluded that transfer to the Northern District of California was appropriate. Id. at 1. After the transfer, the plaintiff moved the California court to amend its complaint to add more defendants, and the original defendants moved to dismiss. Id. at 3. The court “denied Plaintiff’s motion, granted defendants’ motion, and dismissed without prejudice each defendant other than Apple [, apparently envisioning] that Plaintiff would then re-file individual actions against each defendant in the Northern District, actions which might then be coordinated. Instead, Plaintiff chose to initiate suit against four defendants here (and others elsewhere).” Id. at 3-4. Judge Stark concluded that these circumstances weighed in favor of transfer and granted defendants pending motions. Id. at 4.
In a recent memorandum opinion, Judge Andrews granted a motion filed by defendant SAS Institute to sever based on improper joinder, but denied SAS’s motion to transfer the case to its home forum in the Eastern District of North Carolina. Investpic, LLC v. SAS Institute, Inc., C.A. No. 10-1028-RGA (D. Del. May 15, 2012). Investpic filed suit in November 2010 against 15 defendants, including SAS. Applying the Federal Circuit’s standard for improper joinder, the Court severed SAS’s case, finding that “[t]here is no allegation in the complaint that alleges any connection between SAS and any other defendant, or between SAS’s products and any other defendant’s products.” Id. at 3.
The bulk of the Court’s opinion was dedicated to SAS’s motion to transfer, analyzing each of the factors laid out by the Third Circuit in Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879-80 (3d Cir. 1995). In the process, Judge Andrews distinguished the Federal Circuit’s decision in In re Link_A_Media Devices Corp., 662 F.3d 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (discussed here previously), explaining, “I would characterize that case generally as standing for the proposition that when the parties, all the witnesses, and all the evidence are in one distant jurisdiction, and the only connection to Delaware is that it is the state of incorporation of the defendant, and there is no other reason for the suit to be in Delaware, the suit must be transferred, upon timely request, to the distant jurisdiction.” Id. at 11. Judge Andrews explained that the situation in the case at bar was markedly different than that in Link_A_Media, primarily because Investpic and its patent (through previous owners) had a long-standing connection to Delaware, were located closer to Delaware than North Carolina, and because sales of SAS’s accused products took place in Delaware. “[W]hen the plaintiff is a small corporation with Delaware as its long-standing corporate home (as I consider the plaintiff to be . . .), and the defendant is a national company of [SAS’s] size, see Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Altera Corp., 2012 WL 297720, *3 (D. Del. Jan. 24, 2012) (multi-billion dollar companies doing business on an international scale have a greater burden to meet in seeking transfer), there ought to be a compelling reason to overcome plaintiff’s choice of forum.” Id. Although SAS provided a number of valid reasons supporting its motion, the Court found that the overall balance of the Jumara factors did not support a transfer.
In the ongoing litigation between Mylan Pharmaceuticals and Galderma Laboratories over the branded product Oracea, Judge Stark has issued an opinion on remedies for Mylan’s infringement of one patent covering that drug. Judge Stark had previously found after a bench trial that Mylan infringed a patent—the Chang Patent—that was added to the Orange Book after Mylan’s generic product had received FDA approval. Consequently, Mylan’s ANDA did not include a Paragraph IV certification for the Chang Patent. In the recent remedies opinion, Judge Stark ordered a permanent injunction against any drug described in Mylan’s ANDA until the expiration of the Chang Patent. He also ordered the FDA to withdraw approval of Mylan’s ANDA and delay the effective date of approval to no earlier than December 19, 2027, the expiration date of the Chang Patent. The Research Foundation of State University of New York v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., C.A. No. 09-184-LPS, at 3 (D. Del. May 18, 2012).
After considering remedies briefing from the parties, Judge Stark rejected Mylan’s argument that 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(A) did not entitle Galderma to a change in the effective date of Mylan’s ANDA because Mylan had not filed a Paragraph IV certification for the patent which Mylan was found to infringe. The Court found that “a Paragraph IV certification against the Chang Patent was not required for Galderma to bring suit under Section 271(e)(2).” Id. at 9. Judge Stark cited the Federal Circuit’s recent decision in AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP v. Apotex Corp., 669 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2012) that a Paragraph IV certification was not required for subject matter jurisdiction over a patentee’s Section 271(e)(2) claims. Because Galderma had alleged that Mylan’s ANDA filing infringed the Chang Patent, the Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the infringement claim despite the lack of a Paragraph IV certification for that patent. As Judge Stark stated, a Paragraph IV certification is not a “necessary predicate” to an infringement claim under §271(e)(2)(A). Id. at 7-10.
In AstraZeneca, however, the plaintiffs failed to state a viable Section 271(e)(2) claim because the defendant generic manufacturer had carved out patented methods of treatment from their ANDA. By contrast, Mylan’s ANDA product was directly covered by the Chang patent and therefore infringed the Chang Patent under Section 271(e)(2). Accordingly, “because Galderma properly invoked the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, stated a claim pursuant to Section 271(e)(2), and ultimately prevailed on the merits at trial, the Court . . . grant[ed] Galderma’s request for [an order that the FDA delay approval of the ANDA] under Section 271(e)(4)(A).” Id. at 9-10.