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In two recently issued rulings and recommendations, Special Master B. Wilson Redfearn considered defendant motions to strike portions of the plaintiff’s expert reports. In the first ruling, the Special Master considered whether to strike portions of an expert report analyzing alleged infringement by defendants Sprint and Simplexity based on their marketing of Apple products—products which the Special Master previously had “specifically stated . . . were not a part of this case.” Eon Corp. IP Holdings, LLC v. Flo TV Inc., et al., C.A. No. 10-182 (RGA) (D. Del. Aug. 28, 2013). In his ruling, the Special Master explained “[f]or the third time: The [Apple] products identified in the Fourth Supplement of Accused Products are not a part of this case. Those products were untimely identified and, if they had been allowed, it would have compromised not only document production[] but fact discovery as well as the dates and deadlines set out in the agreed Amended Scheduling Order.” Id. at 4 (the Fourth Supplement of Accused Products had been served on February 22, 2013, only 6 days before the document production deadline under the Amended Scheduling Order). Although the plaintiff argued that its earlier disclosures had included references to the Apple products, the Special Master found that the earlier disclosures included “no more than passing references” to them, and did not provide the claim-by-claim contentions necessary to put Sprint and Simplexity on notice that they were accused of infringement based on Apple products. Id. at 4-5.
The Special Master opted not to strike the offending portions of the plaintiff’s expert report, though. Citing a Western District of Pennsylvania decision, and Rule 12(f), the Special Master explained that a court is only permitted to strike matters from the pleadings, and “[a]n expert report is not a pleading.” Id. at 6 (citing Wonderland Nurserygoods Co., Ltd. v. Thorley Indus., LLC, 2013 WL 2471801 (W.D. Pa. June 7, 2013)). Instead, the Special Master explained, Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii) allows a court to enter “an order prohibiting a party from introducing designated matters into evidence.” Id. at 6. The Special Master therefore ruled that, subject to the trial judge’s discretion, “any expert opinion or suggested testimony that assumes or attempts to prove that the Apple wireless devices infringe the ‘757 patent should not be allowed.” Id.
In the second ruling, the Special Master considered a motion filed by defendant Qualcomm to strike portions of the plaintiff’s expert report which stated that Qualcomm’s accused product satisfies the “Radio Wave Transmission and Reception Means” and “Monitoring Means” claims of the patent-at-issue, two claims which were not included in the plaintiff’s infringement contentions. Eon Corp. IP Holdings, LLC v. Flo TV Inc., et al., C.A. No. 10-182(RGA) (D. Del. Sept. 5, 2013). Again citing Wonderland Nursery Goods, the Special Master explained that “a motion to strike parts of a report is not the appropriate method to address this issue. I am therefore treating this as a motion to exclude the evidence at trial.” Id. at 1 n.1.
In this case, the plaintiff responded both in its answering brief and at a hearing before the Special Master that it was not asserting infringement of the “Radio Wave Transmission and Reception Means” claim. On that basis, the Special Master found that there was no need to take action to strike or exclude the portions of the opinion at this stage of the litigation, and instead explained that “the issue can be addressed to the trial judge through an appropriate objection” if and when it is raised at trial. Id. at 2-3. With respect to the “Monitoring Means” claim, the Special Master found that the plaintiff’s expert was entitled to set out his opinion on this claim in response to Qualcomm’s claim construction positions. Based on the relatively early stage of the litigation, the Special Master found that Qualcomm would not be prejudiced by being required now to provide rebuttal expert testimony on the issue. Id. at 3-4.

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In a recent Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Sherry R. Fallon found that plaintiff’s amended complaint, asserting U.S. Patent No. 6,587,441 (“the ‘441 Patent”), should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Mayfair Wireless LLC v. Celico Partnership et al., 11-772-SLR-SRF (D. Del. Aug. 30, 2013). Defendants argued there existed “three breaks in the chain of title of the ‘441 patent” before its alleged assignment to plaintiff. Id. at 6. The named inventors of the ’441 Patent allegedly assigned the patent application to their employer, Gooitech, Inc. (“Gooitech”). Id. at 2. The Hinsdale Bank & Trust Company (“Hinsdale”) eventually “foreclosed on Gooitech’s assets, including the application for the ’441 patent,” and purchased those assets at a UCC sale in Illinois in 2000. Id. at 2-3. Hinsdale purportedly sold its rights in the ’441 patent application to Sierra Strategic Consulting (“Sierra”) pursuant to a bill of sale in 2001. Id. at 3. The bill of sale did not specifically mention the patent application, but referred more generally to “intellectual property rights that Hinsdale acquired from Gooitech.” Id. Sierra assigned its rights to 3P Networks Inc., which “allegedly transferred rights, title and interest in the ‘441 patent application” to Technology Alternatives, Inc. (“Technology Alternatives”). Id. Technology Alternatives, the patentee, eventually became a subsidiary of TechAlt, Inc. (“TechAlt”). Id. at 4. Service by Design, Ltd. (“SBD”) entered into a security agreement with TechAlt, and SBD purchased TechAlt’s assets (including the purported interest in ’441 application) after TechAlt defaulted on its obligations. Id. at 4. After subsequent assignments, the current plaintiff was allegedly assigned the rights to the ’441 Patent. Id. at 4-5.

Magistrate Judge Fallon first addressed whether “any alleged breaks in the chain of title occurring prior to the issuance of the ‘441 patent are irrelevant.” Id. at 6 (emphasis added). Magistrate Judge Fallon concluded that “[d]efendants have overcome the presumption” that the patentee, Technology Alternatives, “properly held legal title at the time the patent issued.” Id. at 8. Judge Fallon explained that “four of the six Named Inventors did not have written assignments on file with the PTO indicating their intention to transfer their ownership interests, in contravention of 35 U.S.C. § 261 and 37 C.F.R. § 3.81(a).” Id. Moreover, “[t]he request for issuance of the patent to Technology Alternatives is likewise missing from the PTO’s records.” Id. In light of these findings, Judge Fallon went on to “asses each alleged break in the chain of title, including those occurring prior to the issuance of the ‘441 patent.” Id. at 9.

With respect to the bill of sale between Gooitech and Hinsdale, Magistrate Judge Fallon found that “[t]he evidence . . . insufficient to support Mayfair’s contention that Hinsdale properly foreclosed on its interest in Gooitech’s property pursuant to the terms of its security agreement.” Id. at 12. Magistrate Judge Fallon noted that the “unsigned notice of public sale issued by Hinsdale on August 9, 2000 fails to list the collateral to be sold.” Id. Moreover, the “subsequent March 31, 2001 bill of sale between Hinsdale and Sierra . . . does not specify that the ‘441 patent application was among those intellectual property rights [noted in the agreement].” Id. at 12-13. Magistrate Judge Fallon thus declined “to assume the rights to the application for the ‘441 patent were included in the foreclosure sale,” and thus found a break in the chain of title. Id. at 13-14.

Next, Magistrate Judge Fallon considered the whether there was a break in the chain of title “between 3P Networks and Technology Alternatives because no written assignment regarding the transfer is on file with the PTO.” Id. at 14. Magistrate Judge Fallon found, however, that “the notice of assignment between 3P Networks and Technology Alternatives sufficiently sets forth an intent to transfer ownership rights in the ‘441 patent to qualify as an assignment for purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 261.” Id. at 15.

Magistrate Judge Fallon also considered, inter alia, whether the “absence of an assignment from Technology Alternatives to TechAlt” created a break in the chain of title. Id. at 17. While the parties agreed there was no formal assignment, Magistrate Judge Fallon still had to address whether “Technology Alternatives consented to TechAlt’s pledge of the ‘441 patent to SBD as collateral in the November 19, 2004 security agreement, whether such consent is valid, and whether an indirect transfer of the ‘441 patent to SBD would cure any defect.” Id. at 18. Magistrate Judge Fallon explained that “[e]ven if the court were to assume that state law permits Technology Alternatives to consent to TechAlt’s inclusion of the ‘441 patent as security, the Illinois UCC provisions are preempted by § 261 of the Patent Act because Technology Alternatives and TechAlt never executed a written assignment.” Id. at 19. Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Fallon could not “overlook the absence of a written assignment between Technology Alternatives and TechAlt,” and found another break in the chain of title. Id. at 20.

In light of the two breaks in the chain of title, Magistrate Judge Fallon recommended that the court grant defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 24.

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In MobileMedia Ideas, LLC v. Apple, Inc., C.A. No. 10-258-SLR-MPT (D. Del. Sept. 5, 2013), Judge Sue L. Robinson granted defendant’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law with respect to invalidity and non-infringement of one patent-in-suit and with respect to invalidity of one claim of another patent-in-suit, and denied the motion in all other respects.

Following a seven-day jury trial in 2012, the jury found direct infringement and validity of the three patents-in-suit. Id. at 1. Defendant renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law that the asserted claims of the three patents-in-suit were invalid and not infringed. Id. The three patents-in-suit (the ’075, ‘068, and ‘078 patents) “relate to a variety of technologies in information processing, computing, and mobile phones.” Id. at 3.

As to the ‘075 patent, entitled “Method and Apparatus for Incoming Call Rejection,” the Court found that its asserted claims were invalid. There was no dispute that two prior art references disclosed the limitations of the asserted claims, but the parties disputed whether there was sufficient motivation to combine them. Id. at 18. The Court concluded that the plaintiff’s expert had “only offered conclusory testimony” to rebut defendant’s evidence and testimony that a person of ordinary skill would have found it obvious to combine these references. Id. at 19. “In addition, [plaintiff’s] infringement theory conflicts with [its invalidity expert’s] opinion.” See id. at 20-21. Therefore, the Court concluded that “even if the jury had resolved all disputed facts in [plaintiff’s] favor, the evidence could not support a finding” of validity. Id. at 22. As to infringement, the Court also granted defendant’s motion because plaintiff had not presented sufficient evidence to support its infringement theory. See id. at 22-27.

As to the ‘068 patent, entitled “Communication Terminal Device and Method for Controlling a Connecting State of a Call into a Desired Connection State upon a Predetermined Operation by a User,” the Court found one asserted claim valid (Claim 23) and the other asserted claim invalid (Claim 24). Defendant’s anticipation arguments as to Claim 23 were grounded in “an untimely claim construction argument,” and the plaintiff’s expert testimony had provided sufficient support for the jury’s finding of validity. Id. at 35. But for Claim 24, unlike for Claim 23, the parties had identified a relevant “pre-trial dispute in their joint claim construction chart . . . [therefore] the court has a duty to resolve [the dispute].” Id. at 36. The Court went on to clarify the construction of a relevant term, id. at 37, and concluded that the jury’s verdict of validity of Claim 24 was “inconsistent” with the Court’s construction of the term. Id. at 38. As to infringement of the ‘068 patent, the Court denied defendant’s motion. See id. at 38-45. The Court also denied the motion as to infringement and validity of the ‘078 patent, entitled “Device for Personal Communication, Data Collection and Data Processing, and a Circuit Card.” See id. at 47-56.

Finally, the Court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial in the alternative. See id. at 56-62. Defendant argued, inter alia, that plaintiff’s statements at closing arguments that companies from whom it obtained patents “decide to invest in patents to recover research and development costs” were directed to damages and therefore improper as damages had been bifurcated. Id. at 57. The Court concluded that the statements were not directed to damages, but Instead were “used to explain what [plaintiff] does as a non-practicing entity”, and were therefore not improper. Id. at 57-58.

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In Softview LLC v. Apple Inc., et al., C.A. Nos. 12-989-LPS & 10-389-LPS (Cons.) (D. Del. Sept. 4, 2013), Judge Leonard P. Stark has ordered a stay, pending inter partes review, until March 31, 2014. While the Court had previously denied defendants’ motion to stay in July 2012, it concluded that circumstances had changed such that a stay was now warranted.

As to prejudice to the plaintiff, while the Court “continue[d] to have . . . concerns” regarding prejudice and the potential tactical advantage for defendants, “subsequent case developments make them less of a problem. In particular, fact discovery is now complete, at least somewhat mitigating the risk of evidentiary staleness. Also, given that [plaintiff] is a non-practicing entity and not seeking injunctive relief, the limited delay . . . should not severely prejudice [plaintiff].” Id. at 2-3.

A stay pending inter partes review would also likely simplify issues for trial. Whereas at the time of the previous request for a stay only some of the asserted claims stood rejected, now the PTAB had granted inter partes review with respect to all asserted claims. Id. at 3.

Finally, while the early stage of the case and the “lengthy process of reexamination” had been factors in the Court’s 2012 denial of a stay, the case had since moved forward “substantially” (the Court, for example, issued a claim construction opinion on the same day as this Order) and “the inter partes review promises to be a more expeditious process than reexamaination and appears to be relatively close to completion.” Id. at 3. Absent a stay, the parties were scheduled to complete expert discovery and file case-dispositive motions by the end of March 2014, but the PTAB was required to issue a final determination by that time unless there was an extension for good cause. Id. at 4. “[U]nder the circumstances, [the Court believed that] it is appropriate to allow the inter partes review a reasonable period to conclude before launching the parties into the expense of expert discovery.” Id.

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Judge Leonard Stark has issued a claim construction opinion in the ongoing Softview litigation, a pre-AIA case involving several defendants that are among the biggest tech companies. Softview’s patents relate to a system and method for rendering, zooming, and panning in a web browser. Judge Stark resolved disputes about the following terms:
– “scalable content”
– “scalable / scaling / scaled”
– “translating”
– “processing [the] HTML-based Web content to produce scalable content”
– “format”
– “vector-based content / scalable vector-based content”
– “vector”
– “object datum”
– “primary datum”
– “layout location datum”
– “enabling the user to zoom and pan a view of the Web page”
– “fit across”
– “tapping”
– “preserve(s) / preserved / preserving / preservation”
– “machine-readable medium”
– “storage means”
– “processing means”
– “wireless communication[s] means”
Softview LLC v. Apple Inc., et al., C.A. No. 10-389-LPS, Memo. Op. at 5-25 (D. Del. Sep. 4, 2013).

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Judge Leonard P. Stark recently construed the non-means-plus-function claim terms of U.S Patent Nos. 6,092,074 and 6,581,065; and resolved the parties’ scheduling dispute regarding briefing of of the means-plus-function claim terms. General Electric Co. v. Kontera Technologies, et al., C.A. No. 12-525-LPS, C.A. No. 12-526-LPS (D. Del. Sept. 3, 2013). Judge Stark construed the terms:

“Class Codes”
“Major Class Codes”
“Preferred Major Class Codes”
“Hit Count Data”
“Intermittent Maintenance Mode”
“Wherein the character strings have no associated hypertext link(s)”
Judge Stark found that the following terms did not require construction:

“Primary Computer”
“Central Computer”
“Associated with a/said Primary Computer”
“Associated with a/said Central Computer”
“Associated with At Least One of Said Destination Addresses” (also determining that the term was not indefinite)
“Which Are Associated With Said Plurality of Linkable Character Strings/Matching Linkable Character String Has a Plurality of Class Codes Associated Therewith” (also determining that the term was not indefinite)
“Determining A Matching Linkable Character String For Said First Character String, If Present, In Said Annotation Database”
“Querying Said Destination Database To Obtain The Plurality Of Destination Addresses Corresponding To The Associated[] Class Codes”
“Providing … Anchor Code(s) Which Relate(s) Said Matching Linkable Character String To Said … Corresponding Destination Addresses To Provide A … Hypertext Link(s) For Said First Character String”
“Said Destination Database Comprises A Plurality Of Destination Addresses Corresponding To Said Plurality Of Class Codes Of The Matching Linkable Character String”
“Writing A Plurality Of Character Strings Into A Primary Computer File”
“Qualifying The Matching Linkable Character String … (Class Codes)”
Judge Stark also ordered supplemental briefing to address the proposed constructions of the disputed means-plus-function claim terms and scheduled a second Markman hearing to address those claim terms.

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In Pragmatus AV, LLC v. Yahoo! Inc., C.A. No. 11-902-LPS-CJB (D. Del. Aug. 28, 2013), Magistrate Judge Christopher J. Burke recommended denial of defendant’s renewed motion to transfer to the Northern District of California. Judge Burke had previously recommended denial of defendant’s motion to transfer (see here), and Judge Stark had accepted the recommendation (see here). Defendant argued that plaintiff’s recent filing of a separate lawsuit against defendant in the Northern District of California (the “California Action”) altered the Jumara factors such that transfer was merited. The California Action involved different patents within the same family as the patents-in-suit in this case and involved the same accused product. Id. at 16.

The Court first addressed the relevance of In re EMC Corp., 501 F. App’x 973 (Fed. Cir. 2013), where the Federal Circuit held that “motions to transfer venue are to be decided based on the situation which existed when suit was instituted,” but also noted that “a district court may properly consider any judicial economy benefits which would have been apparent at the time the suit was filed.” Id. at 8 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). While it observed that “the full scope of In re EMC Corp’s impact and meaning as to this question” was unclear, see id. at 9-10, “[u]ltimately, the Court need not further examine the full scope of the rule . . . [because] even if the Court could properly take all of the proffered facts related to the California Action into account for purposes of the Renewed Motion to Transfer, the Court determines that they do not add support to that motion, nor would they alter the outcome of the First Motion to Transfer.” Id. at 10-11.

The Court went on to reject all of defendant’s arguments that the California Action “undercut” the original reasons for keeping the case in Delaware. As to plaintiff’s forum preference, plaintiffs had provided a “plausible” explanation for suing in different districts that was not a bad-faith attempt to forum-shop. See id. at 11-15. The convenience of the parties factor was also unaffected. Id. at 16. Regarding practical considerations, while transfer could minimize duplication, it was also the case that the patents in the California Action were different, “and so efficiencies gained from transferring this case to the Northern District . . . might not be as extensive as Defendant argues.” Id. at 17. The Court added that transferring the case to California “would almost certainly have the effect of delaying the ‘expeditious’ progress of the case regarding the five patents-in-suit here (which is nearing the close of discovery), in order to account for the fact that the California Action is at its inception.” Id. at 18. “In conclusion, because the filing of the California Action does not, in the Court’s view, alter the calculus as to any of the cited Jumara factors in favor of transfer, the Court recommends denial of [defendant’s] Renewed Motion to Transfer.” Id.

Defendant had moved to enjoin the California Action in the alternative, under the first-filed rule. The Court also recommended denial of this motion, finding that “while there is an overlap in the identity of parties and there may be an overlap of certain legal issues among the two lawsuits, the cases are sufficiently different such that the first-filed rule does not apply,” particularly because there was no overlap of patents between the two actions. Id. at 20.

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Magistrate Judge Mary Pat Thynge recently issued a report recommending constructions for 27 claim terms across eight patents relating to pulse oximetry, which “allows for non-invasive measurement of the oxygen levels in a medical patient’s hemoglobin.” Masimo Corp. v. Philips Electronics North America Corp., C.A. Nos. 09-080-LPS-MPT, 11-742-LPS-MPT (D. Del. Aug. 29, 2013). The following claim terms were construed:

“scan of a plurality of possible values for said physiological parameter”;
“said scan”;
“analysis to determine which of the plurality of possible oxygen saturation values corresponds to the oxygen saturation of the pulsing blood”;
“calculating a plurality of ratios of values of the transformed first signal to corresponding values of the transformed second signal”;
“potential of said physiological parameter”;
“said physiological parameter”;
“determination of confidence in the accuracy of physiological signals”;
“signal confidence determination”;
“confidence measurement”;
“determination of signal confidence”;
“based upon at least two alternative methods of processing the sensed physiological signals from at least one of the first and second wavelengths”;
“based upon at least two alternative methods of processing the physiological signals”;
“based upon at least two different methods of processing the intensity signals”;
“based upon at least two alternative methods of processing the sensed physiological signals from at least one of the first and second wavelengths and the signals corresponding to ambient light”;
“adjustably smooth the plurality of resulting values indicative of the at least one physiological characteristic”;
“adjustably smooth the plurality of values”;
“adjustably smoothing the plurality of values”;
“speed up the adjustable smoothing”;
“the smoothing filter is sped up”;
“slow down the adjustable smoothing”;
“first inactive time period”;
“second inactive time period”;
“second time where it is responsive to said ambient light”;
“inactive portions of a drive cycle where none of said plurality of light sources are active”;
“docking station . . . configured to mate with the portable physiological measurement device”;
“patient monitoring system”; and
“concentration”.

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In a recent memorandum order, Judge Richard G. Andrews considered “various objections that have been made to decisions of the Special Master Collins J. Seitz, Jr., Esq.” Inventio AG v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator Americas Corporation, et al., C.A. No. 08-874-RGA (D. Del. Aug. 15, 2013). First, Judge Andrews considered plaintiff’s objections and motion to modify the Special Master’s ruling with respect to Defendants’ Challenges to Plaintiff’s Designations of Privilege or Work Product in its Third Amended Privilege Log, and granted that motion in part. See id. at 1-3. Judge Andrews adopted the Special Master’s decision with regard to what country’s privilege law applied and denied defendants’ argument that “under the ‘touch base’ test, Swiss law applies because Plaintiff is a Swiss company.” Id. at 2. As Judge Andrews noted, “[i]f Defendants were correct, the ‘touch base’ test would be pretty meaningless, since once citizenship was determined, that would be the end of the analysis.” Id. Judge Andrews then assessed whether various communications were protected by the attorney-client privilege. See id. 2-3. For example, Judge Andrews found that a “communication between two non-lawyers on which a lawyer [was] copied,” and for which there was no indication that it was “sent for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice,” was non-privileged. Id. at 2. Similarly, a communication between an employee of the SEC and a business person of plaintiff was found non-privileged. Id. On the other hand, Judge Andrews found privileged, inter alia, bills from plaintiff’s attorneys for legal services rendered. Id. at 3. Judge Andrews found it sufficient that “[t]he bills identif[ied] specific attorneys billing for legal work, the patents involved, the date of the work, and the general nature of the work.” Id.

Judge Andrews next considered defendants’ objections to and motion to modify the Special Master’s Report and Recommendation on Defendants’ Motion to Reclassify as Non-confidential Information Designated by Plaintiff as Highly Confidential and/or Limited Modification of the Protective Order. See id. at 4-5. Defendants’ motion was granted in part. Specifically, Judge Andrews addressed whether “four categories of deposition excerpts [were] properly marked as ‘highly confidential’” and whether the “Special Master’s discussion concerning modifying the protective order [should] be reviewed.” Id. at 4. First, Judge Andrews found that some excerpts contained publicly available technical information, as those excerpts were, for example, similar to descriptions presented during the Markman hearing or appeared in a publication. See id. As such, Judge Andrews determined that such excerpts should not be marked “highly confidential.” See id. On the other hand, Judge Andrews found that an expert’s analysis of whether certain elements are in the prior art and other non-public technical information were appropriately marked as “highly confidential.” See id. Second, Judge Andrews determined that “[t]he Special Master concluded after a thorough analysis that the protective order should not be modified,” and that the “present objections are without merit.” Id. at 5. Judge Andrews further noted that “[t]here is no reason” to vacate the Special Master’s discussion regarding what the “PTO will consider during reexamination,” as the “Special Master’s Report does not purport to tell any party what information to submit or to withhold from the PTO.” Id.

Judge Andrews additionally considered plaintiff’s objections to the Special Master’s rulings on plaintiff’s and defendants’ motions to compel. See id. at 6-7. First, plaintiff objected to be “being denied discovery on ‘new jobs.’” Id. at 6. Judge Andrews explained that “[e]ven assuming that it is not Plaintiff’s fault that it did not get the discovery before and that it is acting in good faith, the lack of actual prejudice to the Plaintiff and the inherent prejudice to the system of never-ending litigation means that on balance I do not think that discovery should be extended.” Id. at 7. Second, plaintiff “object[ed] to being ordered to produce the Transfer Pricing Analysis, stating that it should only have to produce the portion relating to the United States.” Id. at 6. Judge Andrews found, however, that the Transfer Pricing Analysis was relevant and ordered its production. Id. at 7.

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Fairchild Semiconductor Corp. v. Power Integrations, Inc. is a patent infringement case involving semiconductors, power supplies, and LED circuits. The plaintiff, Fairchild, asserted three patents, and the defendant, Power Integrations, counterclaimed alleging infringement of five additional patents. Following a Markman hearing in July, Judge Stark has now issued a claim construction order in the case. Judge Stark construed the following terms:

– “a second feedback signal associated with a current control loop”
– “generates the first feedback signal by sampling a voltage from the auxiliary winding of the transformer and a discharge time of the transformer”
– “generating the first feedback signal by sampling a voltage from the auxiliary winding of the transformer and a discharge time of the transformer”
– “means for regulating the power supply system”
– “the control circuit and the feedback circuit are operable to regulate”
– “the feedback circuit operable to support regulation by the control circuit”
– “generating a LED current for controlling the LED”
– “a sense terminal of the control circuit, coupled to the LED for detecting a LED voltage, wherein the LED voltage is coupled for adjusting the LED current”
– “a soft start circuit means”
– “An oscillator that provides a maximum duty cycle signal comprising an on-state and an off-state”
– “a control circuit coupled to an input of a power converter”
– “when the electrical energy source is uncoupled from the input of the power converter”
– “a capacitance coupled between input terminals of the input of the power converter”
– “render dormant the drive signal generator”
– “power up the drive signal generator”
– “current input circuit”
– “current limit”
– “current limit adjustment signal”
– “dynamically adjust a current limit”
Fairchild Semiconductor Corp., et al. v. Power Integrations, Inc., C.A. No. 12-540-LPS, Memo. Op. at 1-25 (D. Del. Aug. 28, 2013).

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