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In a recent Order, Judge Richard G. Andrews denied in part defendant’s motion to redact a hearing transcript. M2M Solutions LLC v. Motorola Solutions Inc., C.A. No. 12-33-RGA (D. Del. Feb. 2, 2016). Judge Andrews granted the motion with respect to portions of the transcript regarding profits, third party license agreement royalties, and the index, but denied the remainder of the motion. Judge Andrews was unpersuaded that the “disclosure of the other information will work any clearly defined and serious injury to [defendant].”

Judge Andrews’ decision was guided by Mosaid Tech Inc. v. LSI Corp., 878 F. Supp. 2d 503 (D. Del. 2012) and the factors set forth in Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 1994). Judge Andrews explained as follows:

Simply because the parties have designated the information as confidential, highly confidential, confidential – attorneys’ eyes only, etc., under a protective order is irrelevant to the present issue, that is, whether the information should be redacted from a judicial transcript. There is not much public interest in the information that is exchanged in discovery. Once, however, it is disclosed in a judicial proceedings, it is in the public interest to be able to understand the proceedings before a judge, and redaction of the transcript hinders that public interest. Nevertheless, there are things that might be appropriately sealed in a public proceeding, such as the pricing terms in license agreements, some other non-public financial information, trade secrets, and other proprietary technology. Information in a transcript may hint at some of these things without actually threatening any “clearly defined and serious injury.” Things that typically weigh against the necessity of sealing include that the information is old, or general, or already in the public record, and was relevant to the judicial proceeding. Further, if there is a need for redactions, the proposed redactions should be as narrow as possible.

Judge Andrews also noted that defendant had not “submitted an affidavit/declaration in support of its motion.”

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On May 19 and 20, 2016 the District of Delaware and the Delaware Chapter of the Federal Bar Association will co-host the District’s Second Bench and Bar Conference.   This year’s Bench and Bar Conference will be held at the Chase Center on the Riverfront, located in downtown Wilmington, DE. Lodging for out-of-town guests will be reserved at a discounted rate at the Westin Hotel, which is adjacent to the Chase Center. The Bench and Bar Conference will include plenary CLE sessions, as well as breakout CLE sessions in the areas of Intellectual Property, Bankruptcy, and Criminal Law.

Additional information will be forthcoming over the next few months.

 

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In Bradium Technologies LLC v. Microsoft Corporation, C.A. No. 15-31-RGA (D. Del. Feb. 2, 2016), Judge Richard G. Andrews granted-in-part Defendant’s motion to dismiss pre- and post-suit indirect infringement claims and willfulness claims. The Court granted the motion as to pre-suit induced and contributory infringement, but denied it as to infringement from the date of the complaint, explaining that the complaint’s allegations of pre-suit knowledge were conclusory. Id. at 1 n.1. For example, meetings that took place prior to the issuance o the patents-in-suit, “[h]aving one of the asserted patents cited by the patent examiner on an issued Microsoft patent,” and “vague licensing letters” were insufficient to show pre-suit knowledge Id.

The Court also granted the motion as to willfulness. Id. at 2.

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Judge Andrews recently denied a patent infringement Plaintiff’s opposed motion for a continuance of trial, suggested that his forthcoming pre-trial rulings would not affect the trial sufficiently to justify a continuance, and encouraged the parties to work cooperatively to resolve scheduling issues. As His Honor wrote, “[t]rial is scheduled for April 11, 2016, more than two months from now. It has been on the schedule, without objection, since March 17, 2015. . . . Thus, whatever logistical difficulties Plaintiff’s counsel has, they have existed for more than ten months, and it is too late to raise them now. I also note that lead counsel’s firm’s website states that the firm has ‘nearly 200 attorneys in our IP Department.’ If help is needed, resources appear to be available.” M2M Solutions LLC v. Enfora Inc., et al., C.A. No. 12-32-RGA, Memo. Or. at 1 (D. Del. Feb. 3, 2016).

Judge Andrews continued, “I agree with Defendants that [an expert’s] work schedule does not take precedence over the trial date. I also note that Plaintiff does not seem to be trying very hard to come up with an alternative. For example, perhaps she could give a trial deposition while she’s here for [a related] case. . . . In addition, I note that inventor testimony is optional. I’m sure counsel can think of some other alternatives to postponing the trial.” Id. at 2.

His Honor also noted: “I would expect counsel will be able to make informed decisions about what is likely [regarding pretrial issues], and, in any event, assume that I will decide the summary judgment issues in such a way that we will have a trial on infringement and invalidity. Daubert issues are likely to be resolved similarly to those in, the [related] case, which should be forthcoming shortly. I do not expect to schedule any hearings or arguments on the remaining issues in this case. . . . [And] the parties should meet and confer . . . and decide on a schedule to exchange supplemental damages reports.” Id. at 1-2.

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In Chestnut Hill Sound Inc. v. Apple Inc., C.A. No. 15-261-RGA (D. Del. Jan. 28, 2016), Judge Richard G. Andrews addressed how the Court should handle the stay it had imposed pending the PTAB’s institution decision on inter partes review. At this time, the PTAB had instituted review on one patent-in-sui, for which Plainitff asserted 61 claims against Defendant, but there was an additional patent in the case that was not involved in any IPR for which Plaintiff asserted 14 claims against Defendant.

The Court set ten days for Plaintiff “to decide whether it wants to elect to proceed on the presently asserted claims of the [patent not in IPR] and no more than ten claims of the [patent in IPR]. If Plainitff so chooses, [the Court would] lift the stay now.”

Ultimately, Plaintiff chose to proceed as proposed by the Court, but requested that its deadline to elect the ten claims from the IPR patent be 30 days after the scheduling conference, and requested that the stay be lifted.  D.I. 50.

Update: On February 16, 2016, Judge Andrews rejected Plaintiff’s request to have its election deadline extended and to drop claims without dismissing them with prejudice (D.I. 50 at n.2), explaining that such a proposal was inconsistent with the Court’s intent to simplify the proceedings and “threatened to multiply the proceedings.  If Plaintiff wants to proceed now, it needs to do two things. It needs to elect ten claims of the ‘063 patent, and dismiss the remainder with prejudice.”  Alternatively, Plaintiff could wait until January 2017 and proceed on all claims surviving the PTAB proceedings.

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Chief Judge Stark recently issued a claim construction order involving both alleged means-plus-function claims and a limiting preamble. With regard to the term “cavity forming structure,” Judge Stark found that “the claim language is sufficiently definite and provides sufficient structure for the basic function of ‘forming a cavity’” and that “Defendants have not put forth any expert testimony or other evidence to support their contrary view.” Accordingly, Judge Stark found the term should not be construed under § 112 ¶ 6. Orthopoenix LLC v. Dfine Inc., et al., C.A. No. 13-1003-LPS, Memo. Or. at 2 (D. Del. Feb. 2, 2016). Judge Stark also considered whether the claim preamble “a device for insertion into a vertebral body to apply a force” was limiting and determined that it was because it “provide[s] the antecedent basis for at least the ‘for capable of compacting cancellous bone and moving fractured cortical bone’ referred to in the claim.” Id. at 7.

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Magistrate Judge Christopher J. Burke recently resolved a protective order dispute between the parties as to whether plaintiff’s lead counsel could participate in “any post-grant proceedings in which they would be defending the patents-in-suit.”  Toshiba Samsung Storage Technology Korea Corporation v. LG Electronics, Inc., et al., C.A. No. 15-691-LPS-CJB (D. Del. Feb. 4, 2016).  Judge Burke agreed with defendant that because counsel overlapped between the litigation and the inter partes review proceedings, there was “some risk” that counsel “may ‘inadvertently rely on or be influenced by information they may learn as trial counsel during the course of litigation’ were they, for example, to later participate in the process of ‘strategically amending or surrendering claim scope’ during the IPR proceedings.”  Id. at 3-4.  But, such risk is “less pronounced” as compared to prosecution of a new patent.  Id. at 4.  On the other hand, plaintiff would be prejudiced because they have played “substantial roles” in litigation for plaintiff and “have already been representing [plaintiff] in IPR proceedings for approximately 6 months.”  Id. at 5.   Therefore, Judge Burke concluded that LG did not demonstrate that the potential risk of inadvertent disclosure would outweigh the harm to plaintiff to deny plaintiff the counsel of its choice.  Id.

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Judge Richard G. Andrews recently granted defendant Personalized Media Communication, LLC’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.  Funai Electric Co., Ltd. v. Personalized Media Communication, LLC, C.A. No. 15-558-RGA (D. Del. Jan. 29, 2016).  Judge Andrews also vacated his prior order demanding defendant’s counsel show cause why their pro hac vice status should not be revoked for saving defendant’s better argument for its reply brief in support of its motion.  In its motion, defendant argued that all of its operations “are conducted in either Texas or Virginia”; and that it has little to no connection to Delaware:

PMC does not regularly conduct business in Delaware. It is not registered to do business in Delaware, nor does it have a registered agent authorized for receipt of service in Delaware. PMC has no offices, employees, agents, real estate, or other assets in the state, nor does it own, operate, or manage any entity located or doing business in Delaware. In addition, PMC does not manufacture or sell any products in Delaware or to Delaware residents.

Id. at 2.  Funai argued that personal jurisdiction was proper because defendant consented to jurisdiction, having “previously filed two actions in this court” involving patents that claim priority to the same patent applications as the patents-in-suit.  Id. at 2-3.  Judge Andrews disagreed because defendant’s prior suits were not brought against Funai.  Id. at 5.  In short, there was no “logical relationship” between the parties.  Id. at 4 (“Under Delaware law, a party can be considered to have consented to jurisdiction by ‘instituting another, related suit’ that has some ‘logical relationship’ to the present suit.” (quoting Foster Wheeler Energy Corp. v. Metallgesellschaft AG, 1993 WL 669447, at *1, 4 (D. Del. Jan. 4, 1993)).

Funai also argued that specific jurisdiction was proper because defendant’s filing patent infringement actions in Delaware constitute transacting business in Delaware, and that the claims at issue here “arise out of” those earlier actions.  Id. at 5-6.  Again, Judge Andrews disagreed.  Defendant’s prior actions “involved different parties and different patents” and a declaratory judgment plaintiff’s action only arises out of defendant’s prior filing of suit if those prior actions were filed to enforce the same patents at issue.  Id. at 6-7.

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Judge Sue L. Robinson recently found that a plaintiff’s complaint did not sufficiently demonstrate that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Utah defendants would comport with Delaware’s long-arm statute or the Due Process Clause.  The Court, however, did not grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss, but instead ordered jurisdictional discovery and left open the door to a renewed motion to dismiss following the completion of that discovery.  DNA Genotek Inc. v. Spectrum DNA, et al., Civ. No. 15-661-SLR (D. Del. Feb. 4, 2016).  The defendants were Utah entities, with their principal places of business in Utah, and were “leading provider[s] of products for biological sample collection, such as saliva collection devices . . . for DNA testing.”  The defendants operated a website accessible in Delaware, but did not engage in any e-commerce through their website.  Rather, defendants sold their DNA testing devices to Ancestry.com, which itself sold the devices nationwide, including in Delaware.

Judge Robinson explained that the “dual jurisdiction” or “stream of commerce” theory could be used to establish long-arm jurisdiction under 10 Del. C. § 3104(c)(1) or (c)(4), but added that the touchstone of the theory is “intent and purpose to serve the Delaware market.”  In reviewing the facts as argued in the briefing, the Court ultimately found: “there is no indication of record that Spectrum has shipped or sold any of the accused products in Delaware, or that Spectrum has any control over what Ancestry does with the accused product once it is delivered to Ancestry.”  The Court added, “[s]imply put, aside from delivering the accused product to Ancestry (outside Delaware) who, in turn, is responsible for placing the accused product into the stream of commerce, there is no persuasive evidence of ‘[a]dditional conduct . . . [to] indicate an intent or purpose [on the part of Spectrum] to serve the market’ in Delaware.”  Id. at 8 (quoting Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of Calif., Solano Cty., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987)).  Instead of dismissing the action, however, Judge Robinson ordered jurisdictional discovery on the defendants’ marketing and sales activities and the business relationship with Ancestry.com, and left open the door to a renewed motion under Rule 12(b)(2).

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Chief Magistrate Judge Mary Pat Thynge recently issued a Report and Recommendation regarding defendant Amazon.com, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment of non-infringement.  Hand Held Products, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., et al., C.A. No. 12-768-RGA-MPT (D. Del. Jan. 21, 2016).  The accused products at issue are Amazon mobile apps used by consumers to find and purchase Amazon products from their smartphones.  Id. at 5.  “One way the Amazon Apps can be used to find a product on Amazon is by scanning the barcode of the product.”  Id.  This barcode scanning ability is the feature accused of infringing the patent-in-suit.  Id.  Based on the Court’s claim construction, Amazon argued that “it is undisputed that a user of the Accused Apps cannot take the requisite snapshot by pressing a shutter button, setting a timer, or in any other manner.”  Id. at 8 (emphasis in original).  The Court agreed.  “[T]he Accused Apps provide no mechanism by which a user selects an instant in time to capture a barcode image and, therefore, the Accused Apps do not infringe the asserted claims of the [patent-in-suit].”  Id. (emphasis in original).

UPDATE:  On March 31, 2016, Judge Andrews overruled the plaintiff’s objections to Chief Magistrate Judge Thynge’s report and recommendation, adopted it without modification, and granted summary judgment of non-infringement.  Hand Held Products, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., et al., C.A. No. 12-768-RGA-MPT (D. Del. Mar. 31, 2016)

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