June 3, 2013

Judge Andrews construes claim terms of patent for three cases

Judge Richard G. Andrews recently issued a claim construction Order relating to three cases that had been consolidated for Markman purposes. Power Management Solutions, LLC v. Intel Corporation, et al., C.A. No. 11-743-RGA; Power Management Solutions LLC v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., C.A. No. 12-426-RGA-CJB; Power Management Solutions, LLC v. NVIDIA Corporation, C.A. No. 12-427-RGA (D. Del. May 30, 2013). The patent-in-suit is U.S. Patent No. 5,504,909, entitled “Power management apparatus collocated on the same integrated circuit as the functional unit that it manages.”

Judge Andrews construed the following disputed terms for all three cases:

-“internal” and “external”

-“internal functional circuit”

-“external functional circuit”

-“externally generated”

-“second externally generated electrical signal”

-“internal functional circuit function”

-“allowing submicrosecond recovery of internal functional circuit function upon the assertion of the second externally generated electrical signal”

Judge Andrews also construed the following terms specifically for Power Management Solutions, LLC v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., C.A. No. 12-426-RGA-CJB:

-“first electrical signals”

-“electrical power is controllably passed from an external power supply through the power gating means to the internal functional circuit”

-“one or more first electrical signals are controllably passed between an external functional circuit and the internal functional circuit via the switching means”

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June 3, 2013

Judge Sleet orders production of documents related to revival of patent application under crime-fraud exception

In Shelbyzyme, LLC v. Genzyme Corporation, C.A. No. 09-768-GMS (D. Del. May 22, 2013), Chief Judge Gregory M. Sleet issued an Order granting in part defendant’s request for production of documents under the crime-fraud exception. Defendant alleged that the patent applicants had committed fraud in reviving a patent application because the abandonment and/or delay in revival was intentional, but the applicants had represented to the PTO that the abandonment and delay were unintentional. Id. at 2 n.1.

“Communications that otherwise would be shielded by the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine forfeit such protection when they are made in furtherance of a fraud or crime.” Id. The Court concluded that defendant had not established a prima facie case for fraud as to the abandonment because its arguments were speculative. Id. However, defendant had established a prima facie case for fraud as to the delay in revival, in alleging that the applicants “knew at least as early as December 1999 that the Issue Fee had not been paid; [the prosecuting attorney] had received the Notice of Abandonment . . . in January 2000; and [the applicants] knew at least by early 2000 that the [patent application] had been abandoned.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Communications in 1999 between the applicants and other individuals regarding the fact that the application’s Issue Fee had not been paid, and that failure to pay would result in abandonment, “permit[ted] the reasonable inference that [the applicants] knew . . . that the [application] had been abandoned.” Id. The Court also concluded that “[g]iven the apparent falsity of the applicants’ representation to the PTO and their demonstrated knowledge that 37 C.F.R. § 1.137(b) required the entire delay to be unintentional, an inference of intent [to deceive] is not only reasonable but effectively required here.” Id. While it would be necessary for defendant to show “clear evidence of deceptive intent,” “there is no reason that ‘clear evidence’ cannot take the form of a well-supported inference.” Id. at 3 n.1. Finally, although the PTO may have been aware that it sent the Notice of Allowance and Notice of Abandonment to the applicants, “it could not independently determine what the applicants themselves knew,” and therefore the alleged misrepresentations to the PTO established reliance and causation. Id.

The Court ordered plaintiff to produce the requested documents only within a limited time period (November 2001 – February 2001) and that related to the revival of the patent application. “Given the narrow basis articulated above for the court’s invocation of the crime-fraud exception,” the Court concluded that the only communications made in furtherance of the fraud were those relating to the revival of the patent application, and not “the otherwise protected communications made leading up to the July 1999 response to Office Action or the October 1999 Issue Fee due date.” Id. at 3 n.2.

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June 3, 2013

Judge Burke recommends granting plaintiff’s motion to substitute, granting defendant’s motion to transfer, denying parties’ motions to dismiss in ANDA litigation

Recently, in Abbott Laboratories v. Roxane Laboratories, Inc., C.A. No. 12-457-RGA-CJB (D. Del. May 28, 2013), Magistrate Judge Christopher J. Burke issued a report and recommendation with respect to four motions pending before the Court in this ANDA litigation, providing the following recommendations: (1) granting Abbott Laboratories’ (“Abbott”) motion to substitute AbbVie, Inc. (“AbbVie”) as plaintiff in the action; (2) denying Roxane Laboratories, Inc.’s (“Roxane”) motion to dismiss Abbott’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; (3) granting Roxane’s motion to transfer venue to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio; (4) denying Abbott’s motion to dismiss “all claims and counterclaims related to the two asserted patents without prejudice” as moot. Id. at 1.

In October 2011, Abbott had announced that it would be undergoing a significant reorganization. Id. at 2. Pursuant to the reorganization, Abbott split into two publicly traded companies, one which focuses on developing pharmaceuticals and another which focuses on developing “diversified medical products.” Id. AbbVie is the pharmaceutical-focused company and is a Delaware corporation. Id. The medical product company retained the Abbott name and is an Illinois corporation. Id. Abbott’s headquarters are in Abbott Park, Illinois. Id.

On April 10, 2012, following an amendment to its ANDA, Roxane filed suit in the Southern District of Ohio seeking a declaratory judgment that Abbott’s U.S. Patent Nos. 7,148,359 and 7,364,752 are invalid and/or not infringed. Id. at 4. That same day, Abbott filed suit in the District of Delaware alleging infringement of the patents in the Ohio action in addition to U.S. Patent No. 5,648,497. Id. On April 11, 2012, Abbott filed an amended complaint asserting additional infringement claims with respect to U.S. Patent Nos. 6,037,157 and 6,703,40. Id. In view of its reorganization, Abbott assigned all its Delaware patents-in-suit to AbbVie on August 1, 2012. Id. at 5. Then, on August 29, 2012, Roxane filed it motion to dismiss with its motion to transfer pending. Id. at 5-6. That same day, following Roxane’s filing, Abbott filed its motion to substitute. Id. at 6.

Judge Burke first addressed Abbott’s motion to substitute AbbVie, and Roxane’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as both motions implicated the issue of “how . . . Abbott’s assignment of the patents-in-suit to AbbVie impact this litigation.” Id. at 6. Judge Burke explained “it is undisputed that when the original Complaint was filed, Abbott was the owner of the patents-in-suit and that it had standing to sue.” Id. at 10. Abbott argued that “pursuant to [Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(c)], its motion to substitute AbbVie as plaintiff in this action ‘was timely and the correct mechanism for bringing AbbVie into the case in Abbott’s stead.’” Id. at 12. On the other hand, Roxane argued that the “standing issue should be judged at the moment there is a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. It was thus Roxane’s position that because Abbott “relinquish[ed] its rights to the patent during the pendency of the litigation,” the dispute became moot and there was “no justiciable dispute between Abbott and Roxane [such that the Amended Complaint]” must be dismissed. Id. at 11-12.

First, Judge Burke found that the timing of Abbott’ motion to substitute was not dispositive, and that Abbott’s filing of its motion “mere hours after the filing of Roxane’s Motion to Dismiss . . . militates that the case be dismissed.” Id. at 19. Specifically, Judge Burke explained that “‘[i]n circumstances where dismissal for lack of initial standing is not required, the Supreme Court [has] held that jurisdictional defects can be cured before judgment,’” and that “the temporary loss of standing during patent litigation can be cured before judgment.” Id. at 19. Second, Judge Burke found that “Rule 25(c) may be used to cure a lack of standing incurred after the filing of the complaint as long as the claims survived assignment.” Id. at 25. In light of these findings, Judge Burke recommended that Abbott’s motion to substitute be granted and Roxane’s related motion to dismiss be denied. Id. at 25-26.

With respect to its motion to transfer, Roxane argued that transfer was warranted pursuant to the first-filed rule because “the Ohio Action was filed prior the Delaware Action, and because the Ohio Action involved the same parties and subject matter as the Delaware Action.” Id. at 27. Judge Burke explained that “the first-filed rule is meant to identify cases that, if not mirror images of each other, are so indistinguishable that, in essence, they can be said to arise from the ‘same set of facts.’” Id. at 31. Judge Burke found that “although there will be significant commonalities of fact and law among the two suits, the subject matter of the suits are different enough to render the first-filed rule inapplicable.” Id. at 28. As Judge Burke explained, not only were there three patents in the Delaware action that were not asserted in the Ohio action, there also existed substantive differences among those patents, including differences in subject matter, inventors, and the scope of potentially invalidating prior art. Id. at 28-31.

Despite Judge Burke's recommendation that first-filed rule did not apply, he was nevertheless required to address whether the case should be transferred pursuant to the traditional 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) analysis. Id. at 32. Judge Burke found that “this is a case where Delaware has no ties to Abbott or Roxane, while the proposed transferee forum not only has ties to both parties and to the underlying dispute, but is also the forum in which litigation regarding the same ANDA is already ongoing.” Id. at 52. Judge Burke further noted that “[a]lthough Abbott’s choice of forum is entitled to considerable deference . . . the balance of the Jumara factors weigh strongly in favor of transfer.” Id. at 53. Accordingly, Judge Burke ultimately recommended that the Court transfer the Delaware action to the Southern District of Ohio, and that the Court deny Abbott’s motion to dismiss as moot in view of that transfer recommendation. Id. at 52-53.

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June 3, 2013

Judge Stark grants-in-part defendants' motions to dismiss Clouding IP LLC's infringement claims

Judge Stark recently considered defendants' various motions to dismiss Clouding IP LLC's allegations of infringement filed in three related and coordinated cases. Clouding IP, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., et al., C.A. Nos. 12-641-LPS, 12-642-LPS, 12-675-LPS (D. Del. May 24, 2013). First, the Court denied defendant Oracle's motion to dismiss Clouding's direct infringement claims because the claims were sufficient under the Federal Rule's Form 18. Id. at 3-4. The claims identified "a description of the accused Oracle products . . . [and] also identified at least one accused product or product category[.]" Id. at 4. The Court rejected Oracle's argument that Form 18 also required Clouding "to specify what functionality infringed, or any facts that show how [Oracle] performs even one step of a claimed method." Id. (internal quotation omitted) (alteration in original).

All defendants moved to dismiss Clouding's inducement claims because the claims did not adequately plead knowledge of the asserted patents prior to filing the complaint, and failed to plead specific intent to induce infringement. Id. at 5. Clouding argued that its inducement claims were limited to post-filing conduct, thus pre-filing knowledge was not required; and argued that intent was established by Defendants' continued infringement despite knowledge of the complaint. Id. at 5-6. Judge Stark granted defendants motion, however, because Clouding's argument "only holds true . . . if the complaint contains
sufficient facts to support an inference that Defendants specifically intended or encouraged others to directly infringe. No such facts are found in Clouding's [complaints] nd, as a result, Clouding cannot rely on Defendants' continued infringement to support an induced infringement claim." Id. at 6.

All defendants also moved to dismiss Clouding's claims of willful infringement based on Clouding's failure to allege pre-filing knowledge of the asserted patents, and because Clouding had not sought a preliminary injunction for any post-filing conduct. Id. at 6-7. Judge Stark denied defendants' motions. Regarding pre-filing knowledge, Clouding argued that because it amended its original complaints to add willful infringement claims, "the time between the filing of the original complaint and the filing of the amended complaint should be deemed 'pre-filing' conduct under Seagate." Id. at 7. (referring to In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). Judge Stark agreed. "For purposes of pleading willful infringement, there appears to be little practical difference between a precomplaint notice letter informing a defendant about a patentee's allegation of infringement and a subsequently-superceded original complaint formally alleging infringement." Id. Regarding Clouding's failure to seek a preliminary injunction, Judge Stark noted that there is no per se requirement that a plaintiff file for a preliminary injunction before raising a willful infringement claim, and Clouding's claims were not based solely on post-filing conduct since the claims were based at least in part on conduct predating the "operative amended complaint." Id. at 8.

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May 30, 2013

Judge Andrews construes claims relating to online auctions.

Judge Richard G. Andrews recently construed several claims in U.S. Patent No. 7,801,802, “Method, system and computer program product for facilitating an auction behavior and automatic bidding in an auction.” Walker Digital, LLC v. Google, Inc., et al., C.A. No. 11-311-RGA (D. Del. May 22, 2013). The Court adopted the parties’ agreed upon the construction of the following terms, as follows:

“bid” agreed to mean “an offer from or on behalf of a bidder that includes an offered price for the good or service being auctioned”

“the highest bid in the auction is not from the bidder” agreed to mean “the highest offer received for the item is not from the bidder”

“determin[ing] that the rule is satisfied; determin[ing] that the highest bid in the auction is not from the bidder; and plac[ing] the bid” agreed to require that “‘determining’ steps must be performed before ‘placing’ step.”

The Court construed the disputed claims as follows:

“auction” construed to mean “a public or private sale in which goods or services of a seller may be sold to a bidder through a bidding process. An auction consists of one sale.”

“bid generator” construed to mean “a computer program or part of a computer program that bids for a bidder in amounts above the initial price or another bidder’s bid.”

The Court declined to construe three claims, finding that the defendants failed to overcome the strong presumption that claims that do not use the word “means” are not means-plus-function claims.

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May 29, 2013

Judge Robinson denies defendant’s motion for leave to amend allegations in answer

In a recent order, Judge Sue L. Robinson denied defendant’s motion for leave to amend paragraph 19 of its answer, which responded to plaintiff’s infringement allegations regarding U.S. Patent No. 6,647,450. Cradle IP, LLC v. Texas Instruments, Inc., C.A. No. 11-1254-SLR (D. Del. May 23, 2013). In paragraph 19, defendant originally alleged that it had made, used, sold, or offered to sell microprocessor and OMAP devices “utilizing split transaction buses with target device command buffers (insofar as that phrase is given its common meaning and not necessarily the meaning that may be ascribed to it as a result of any claim construction).” Id. at 1-2. On January 23, 2013, more than two months after the deadline to amend the pleadings, defendant filed its motion for leave, seeking to change paragraph 19 such that it would state that defendant “denies that its OMAP devices utilize split transaction buses with target device command buffers.” Id. at 3. Because defendant moved to amend its answer after the deadline to amend the pleadings, Judge Robinson’s analysis was guided by both Rules 15(a)(2) and 16(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. at 3-7.

With respect to Rule 15(a)(2), Judge Robinson first addressed whether defendant’s delay was undue. Id. at 4. Defendant argued that its delay would “not place an unwarranted burden on the court or [plaintiff] because it put [plaintiff] on notice of its proposed amendment before any depositions occurred and before the close of fact discovery.” Id. at 4. Judge Robinson found, however, that defendant failed to explain why it “did not seek to amend before the expiration of the deadline to amend pleadings,” and also found that the amendment was not “based on any new evidence that has emerged during discovery.” Id. at 5. Judge Robinson therefore found the delay undue “[g]iven the lack of proper justification.” Id. Judge Robinson further found that the undue delay would be prejudicial to defendant. Id. at 7. The amendment, Judge Robinson explained, “does not merely add particularity to its pleadings; it seeks to remove a qualification in its answer such that the response becomes an outright denial.” Id. at 7. Judge Robinson further explained that plaintiff “relied upon [defendant’s] answer and prepared its case in accordance with those pleadings” and that “[t]o allow [defendant] to change the landscape of the litigation at this late date would be prejudicial to [plaintiff].” Id. Given that defendant’s undue delay would result in prejudice to plaintiff, Judge Robinson found that defendant failed to satisfy Rule 15(a)(2). See id. at 6-7.

Judge Robinson additionally found that defendant failed to meet the “good cause” requirement for amendment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Id. at 7-8. Judge Robinson noted that “the good cause standard under Rule 16(b) hinges on diligence of the movant, and not on prejudice to the non-moving party.” Id. at 7. As Judge Robinson explained, defendant failed to offer “any explanation as to why it could not reasonably meet the scheduling order’s November 1, 2012 deadline for amending the pleadings.” Id. at 8.

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May 29, 2013

Judge Thynge considers motions to exclude expert testimony

Magistrate Judge Mary Pat Thynge recently issued a report and recommendation deciding four motions to exclude testimony and opinions of the parties’ experts. Masimo Corporation v. Philips Electronics North American Corporation, et al., C.A. No. 09-080-LPS-MPT (D. Del. May 20, 2013). The details of the case can be found here, in the Court’s previous report and recommendation regarding other motions at issue in the case.

The Court recommended exclusion of the following expert testimony:

-Defendants offered three experts to support their claim that one of their products was an acceptable non-infringing alternative. The Court recommended exclusion of any testimony by one of the experts concerning the significance of FDA approval or clearance regarding the performance of defendants’ product. This expert admitted that he was only familiar with the FDA approval process “in vague terms” and had “never been part of a formal application process for a device as of yet.” Id. at 17. But this expert’s “limited[]” reliance on FDA approval standards did not preclude the rest of his testimony because “the foundation for [this expert’s] opinion and testimony does not rest on FDA approval standards for medical devices.” Id.

-Plaintiff offered an expert (Dr. Quill) to support its claim that defendants’ product was not an acceptable non-infringing alternative. First, Dr. Quill’s testimony was inadmissible as to what would be acceptable to defendants’ customers because he did not speak to any such customers. Id. at 23-24. On the other hand, his background made him qualified to “testify about the type of medical equipment which meets the needs of medical professionals and hospitals.” Id. Second, “Dr. Quill may testify there is lack of peer reviewed studies on [defendants’ product] showing that it is an acceptable alternative, but cannot opine or testify that [the product] is [an] unacceptable alternative due to the lack of such studies.” Id. at 24. This expert had “admitted the absence of evidence demonstrating acceptability of a medical device does not prove the device is unacceptable.” Id.

-Dr. Quill’s supplemental report, filed after the applicable deadline, was inadmissible as untimely. Id. at 25. Plaintiff had not presented evidence that the information in the report could not have been prepared in the initial expert report. “Further, the scheduling order has been modified at the request of the parties several times, and none permit supplemental reports. If either party desired the option of supplemental reports, the matter could have been addressed in the numerous changes to the scheduling order, or requested of the court long before discovery ended.” Id. at 26.

-Defendants’ damages expert (Dr. Keeley) was precluded from relying on a certain license agreement as a basis for the reasonable royalty rate because there was insufficient evidence that this agreement was comparable to a hypothetical negotiated license for patents-in-suit. Id. at 45.

-The Court also limited Dr. Keeley’s testimony to the extent he provided an independent opinion on the acceptability of defendants’ product as a non-infringing alternative because this expert was an economist and not a medical professional. Id. at 40. But Dr. Keeley could rely on the admitted opinions of defendants’ other experts regarding acceptable non-infringing alternatives in order to calculate damages. Id.

-Defendants’ motion to exclude testimony of plaintiff’s damages expert (Wagner) attacked this opinion on nine different grounds. The Court recommended granting the motion with regard to two of them. First, the testimony regarding plaintiff’s profit margin was unreliable. “Wagner’s testimony evidence[d] a lack of familiarity with the underlying data for his conclusions on profit margin. In evaluating [plaintiff’s] profit margin, Wagner delegated work to his staff. As shown in his deposition, Wagner was unfamiliar with the supporting documents and other details for his assumptions.” Id. at 60. Second, Wagner’s opinion that defendants’ product was an unacceptable alternative was excluded to the extent the analysis relied on excluded testimony of Dr. Quill. Id. at 66.

The Court recommended denial of the parties’ motions with respect to the following:

-With the exception of the above re: testimony on FDA approval or clearance, plaintiff’s motion to exclude the testimony of defendants’ experts regarding acceptable non-infringing alternatives should be denied. Id. at 18.

-Dr. Quill’s testimony that plaintiff’s commercial success was due to its advanced technology was admissible. Dr. Quill relied on the “technical expertise” of another expert to support a finding that a nexus existed between plaintiff’s commercial success and the patents-in-suit. Id. at 28. This combination of expert opinions to show a nexus was appropriate, and “demonstrate[d] the required nexus and bases for commercial success.” Id.

-Dr. Keeley’s testimony was admissible to the extent it concluded what a hypothetical consumer of defendants would consider an acceptable alternative. “[Plaintiff] misapplie[d] the analysis in [Grain Processing Corp. v. American Maize-Products Co., 185 F. 3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 1999) in arguing Dr. Keeley’s analysis was improper]. The focus is not what [defendants] would or would not consider to be an acceptable alternative, but rather, what a [hypothetical] consumer would or would not consider to be an acceptable alternative.” Id. at 42.

-Dr. Keeley’s testimony that limited plaintiff’s incremental profit margins based on regression analysis was admissible. “The court’s role [as gatekeeper] is to determine whether Dr. Keeley’s methodology is scientifically acceptable, not which calculation or opinion is more correct [between his and the expert of plaintiff]. . . . [T]he approach by Dr. Keeley is reasonable and substantially equivalent to [plaintiff’s] expert’s methodology.” Id. at 43.

-The Court rejected the majority of defendants’ arguments for excluding Wagner’s testimony as going to the weight of the evidence or to issues that may be addressed at cross examination. See id. at 46-66.

-Wagner’s testimony on a reasonable royalty rate was admissible because the report applied the Geogia-Pacific factors and Wagner’s “prior application of [these factors had been] affirmed by the Federal Circuit” in another case. Id. at 55.

-Wagner’s opinion on future damages was also admissible. The “commensurably greater” standard of Oiness v. Walgreen, Co., 88 F.3d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1996), which defendants cited, applies to the burden “the patentee must meet to justify future damages” but “has no bearing on the admissibility of expert testimony, if Rule 702 is satisfied.” Id. at 57-58.

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May 28, 2013

Judge Robinson transfers litigation between Delaware corporations to the Northern District of California.

Judge Sue L. Robinson recently transferred a case between two Delaware corporations to the Northern District of California. Fortinet, Inc. v. FireEye, Inc., Civ. No. 12-1066-SLR (D. Del. May 16, 2013). Both parties were headquartered in Northern California. The plaintiff was significantly larger than the defendant, and had previously been involved at least five times in litigation in the Northern District of California. Id. at 1. The defendant, on the other hand, had no federal litigation history. Id. at 1-2. The Court recognized that the plaintiff’s preferred venue “remains a significant factor” in the Jumara analysis, id. at 4, but found that on balance, the case presented “extenuating circumstances”, including that both parties were headquartered in Northern California, the defendant was smaller and had no federal litigation experience, and the plaintiff was pursuing, in addition to its patent infringement claims, California state law claims for misappropriation of trade secrets and intentional interference with contractual relations and prospective economic advantage. Id. at 7.

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May 24, 2013

Direct infringement claims survive motion to dismiss, "barely" satisfying Form 18

Judge Andrews recently considered a motion to dismiss allegations that PayPal's "network products and/or services that use Remote Direct Memory Access (RDMA)" infringe plaintiff's patent by "operating according to the InfiniBand specification." Infinite Data LLC v. PayPal, Inc., C.A. No. 12-1622-RGA (D. Del. May 17, 2013). Noting that "extremely minimal allegations" can satisfy Form 18, Judge Andrews denied the motion. Id. at 1-2 (citing In re Bill of Lading, 681 F.3d 1323, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2012):

"Were there only Bill of Lading, I would probably dismiss this Complaint. Nevertheless, as the Complaint sets forth what the patent claims, what sort of computer system is supposed to be practicing the patented method, and refers to the InfiniBand technology (which presumably means something to people in the field) to further give notice to the Defendant of how its products and services are practicing the patented method, I think the Plaintiff has pled enough, albeit barely, to sustain the Complaint." Id. at 2.

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May 24, 2013

Judge Sleet Denies Motion to Dismiss False Marking Claims under Rule 9(b)

Chief Judge Gregory Sleet recently denied a defendant’s motion to dismiss false marking counts of a complaint. See Devicor Medical Products, Inc. v. Biopsy Sciences, LLC, C.A. No. 10-1060-GMS, Order at 1 (D. Del. May 17, 2013). Defendant Biopsy Sciences sought to dismiss the false marking claims on grounds that the plaintiff, Devicor Medical Products, did not sufficiently plead the intent required by Rule 9(b). In his order, Judge Sleet acknowledged that Federal Circuit precedent required application of Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard to false marking claims. Judge Sleet continued, however, that Devicor “is not required to prove its case at the pleadings stage. Rather, the court need only ask whether the [complaint] ‘allege[s] sufficient underlying facts from which [the] court may reasonably infer that a party acted with the requisite state of mind.’” Id. Because Devicor “offered specific allegations directed towards its position that Biopsy had knowledge of the alleged mismarking and took affirmative actions to mislead the public,” Judge Sleet found “the necessary ‘objective indication’ from which the court may draw a reasonable inference of intent” and deny the motion to dismiss. Id.

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