Judge Leonard P. Stark recently denied a plaintiff’s motion to dismiss counterclaims for direct, indirect, and willful infringement. Fairchild Semiconductor Corp. v. Power Integrations, Inc., C.A. No. 12-540-LPS (D. Del. Mar. 29, 2013). The Court first considered the plaintiff’s argument that an allegation of infringement by “power supply controllers that include a ‘soft start’ feature and circuit covered by one or more claims of the ’366 patent” failed to sufficiently identify the accused products. Id. at 3-4. Judge Stark explained that “this Court has repeatedly declined to dismiss pleadings that accuse general categories of products[,]” because that is all Form 18 requires. Id. at 3-4. With respect to the specific allegation at issue, the Court explained that the defendant “has expressly identified a general category of products, power supply controllers, and further restricted that category to controllers that include certain features and circuits.” Id. at 4.
The Court next considered whether the defendant sufficiently pled “that [the plaintiff] had knowledge of the patents-in-suit prior to [the defendant] filing its counterclaims[.]” Id. at 7. The Court explained that “service of a complaint constitute[s] sufficient notice for an inducement claim based on post-filing conduct.” Id. at 6. Accordingly, the motion was denied to the extent it targeted post-filing conduct by the plaintiff. Id. The Court reached the same result with respect to the plaintiff’s argument that “specific intent to induce infringement” was not adequately pled, explaining that the defendant “satisfied the pleading requirements for induced infringement [of all asserted patents] based on post-filing conduct.” Id. at 8. The Court noted that the allegations were more specific with respect to the ’366 patent, and rejected the plaintiff’s suggestion that those allegations were insufficient because they were pled “on information and belief,” explaining “[v]iewing a complaint in the ‘light most favorable to plaintiff’ may ‘include[] facts alleged on information and belief.’” Id. at 8 n.9 (quoting Frederick Hart & Co. v. Recordgraph Corp., 169 F.2d 580, 581 (3d Cir. 1948) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Finally, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s suggestion that the inducement counterclaims should be dismissed for failure to identify specifically a direct infringer, explaining “a plaintiff need not identify a specific direct infringer if it pleads facts sufficient to allow an inference that at least one direct infringer exists.” Id. at 6 (quoting In re Bill of Lading, 681 F.3d 1323, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
Judge Stark also denied the plaintiff’s alternative request that the defendant be ordered to provide a more definite statement under Rule 12(e), explaining “[t]he Court has determined that [the defendant’s] counterclaims provide sufficient notice of the infringement allegations [and] are not ‘so vague and ambiguous’ that [the plaintiff] cannot frame a responsive pleading.” Id. at 9-10.
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